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1. INTRODUCTION
A central theoretical question is how organization makes a difference to economic
performance.  Obviously, technology will have a great bearing on the way a firm
or economy performs.  But, by organization we mean the command-and-
communication structure built on top of technology, eg the way a corporation is
subdivided into different divisions and subdivisions, and the way a planned
economy (such as China or the Soviet Union) or a multinational bureaucracy (such
as the World Bank or the European Union) is subdivided into different functional
or regional governing bodies.  In this paper we propose a simple theory through
which the effects of different organizational forms on performance can be
compared.
In reality, the choice of productive technique and that of organizational
structure may not be altogether independent decisions:  to some extent, the former
may dictate the latter and vice versa.  But to focus on the effect of organization, we
abstract from this interaction and assume that technology, modeled as a collection
of plants, is fixed.  In this way, we can explore the implications of alternative
organizational forms erected on top of these plants.
In our framework, an organization is a network of managers who oversee a
set of plants directly or indirectly.  Any theory of organization must articulate what
it is that managers do.  For example, in Mirrlees (1976), Calvo and Wellisz (1978),
and Qian (1994), they monitor the efforts of other managers or of plant workers.
In our setting, managers handle shocks that affect a plant’s performance or the
value of its output.  Such shocks include shifts in input supply or output demand,
changes in the weather, or technological advances.  A manager’s job is to determine
the operational implications of these shocks for the plants under his charge and to
communicate these implications to his subordinates.
We assume that managers are costly to hire, and so the first issue that arises
is whether or not it is desirable to assign a manager at all to a given shock.  In our
model, managers are more valuable, the bigger the shock (as measured by its
variance).  And so, our prediction is that managers will be installed for sufficiently
volatile shocks.
The next issue is whether organization itself is necessary:  Why isn’t each
plant a fully autonomous entity?  Mirrlees (1976), Calvo and Wellisz (1978), and
Qian (1994) do not address this issue.  They simply assume that all plants are
“controlled” by the some central agency, but do not examine why this should be so,
eg why some of the plants should not be spun off into separate organizations.
2One answer is that there may be an organizational economy of scale  to a
more integrated structure.1  In our setting, there is a natural source for such a scale
economy:  a shock may affect more than one plant.  Thus, if managers are costly
to hire, having one high-level manager handle the shock for all affected plants can
be more efficient than having the same shock handled repeatedly by separate
managers in each of these plants.
The implication of this is that, in a setting in which there are large shocks
hitting multiple plants, the organization that is optimal in the sense of maximizing
net economic value will be highly integrated.  This leads us naturally to the M-form
(multi-divisional form) and U-form (unitary form), which in our model are the two
possible fully-integrated organizations.  
Both structures have figured prominently in corporate history (see Chandler,
1962).  A classic example of the U-form was the Ford Motor Company before the
Second World War.  In those days, Ford was organized into a number of
functionally specialized departments:  production, sales, purchasing, and so on.  In
other words, the various departments carried out complementary tasks; none was
independent of the others.  By contrast, General Motors under Alfred Sloan became
the prototypical M-form; GM comprised (and still comprises) a collection of fairly
self-contained divisions, eg Chevrolet, Pontiac, and Oldsmobile.
The terms ‘M-form’ and ‘U-form’ have been applied primarily to
corporations.  Recently, however, they have been brought into the study of
comparative economic systems.  In particular, Qian and Xu (1993) observed that
an important difference between the economy of the former Soviet Union and that
of China lies in their respective organizational structures.  The Soviet economy was,
in effect, a gigantic U-form; it consisted of approximately 60 specialized ministries,
eg steel or mining.  Since 1958, however, the Chinese economy has more closely
resembled an ‘M-form;’ it comprises 30 reasonably self-sufficient provinces or
regions.
The Soviet economy turned out to be a disaster, whereas the growth rate in
China remains strong.  Could the difference in organizational form help explain this
contrast?  We argue that an M-form seems likely to dominate from the standpoint
of providing managerial incentives.  Suppose that managers  — regardless of the
organizational form — must be provided with incentives to act in the organization’s
interest.  One way to do this is to reward them on the basis of performance.  But,
in view of the shocks we have been discussing, performance will not be perfectly
correlated with managerial effort.  Thus, if the manager of region A shows a poor
performance, he may try to blame the outcome on bad luck rather than on lack of
effort.  This defense will not be so persuasive, however, if other regions are
prospering.  Thus, it will, in general, be desirable to make the manager’s reward
depend not only on absolute performance but also on performance relative to that
in other regions.
3This is, of course, a familiar idea — the principle of yardstick competition
(see, for example Lazear and Rosen, 1981, Holmstrom, 1982, Nalebuff and Stiglitz,
1883, and Shleifer 1985).  But the question arises:  why can we not do the same
thing in a U-form?  After all, in theory, we could compare the steel minister’s
performance with that of the mining minister.  Admittedly, this seems intuitively
more difficult than comparing regions that produce more-or-less the same array of
goods.  But on what is this intuition founded?
We argue that one possible foundation is the idea that the ‘variation’ between
the performances of two regions producing similar outputs is likely to be lower (in
the appropriate statistical sense) than that between the performances of two
production ministries.  If this is, in fact, so, then it may shed light on the Chinese
success story.  Of course, this comes down in the end to a matter of empirics.  But
here our analysis from 520 Chinese state-owned enterprises data seems to support
the hypothesis that it is “easier” to compare different regions than different
industries.
The more general lesson that our Chinese example illustrates is that different
organizational forms give rise to different information on which incentives can be
based.  Thus in the end, our theory of organizational form consists of three guiding
principles:  (1) an organization should exist when shocks are big enough to warrant
the expense of managers; (2) it should exploit managerial scale economies through
integration; and (3) it should take into account the informational structure it induces
and, in particular this structure's effect on incentives.
We proceed as follows.  In Section 2, we lay out the model.  In Section 3, we
present our theoretical results.  Proposition 1 establishes that if all shocks are
sufficiently big, then a fully-integrated organization — an M-form or U-form — is
the optimal organizational form.  Proposition 3 shows that the M-form provides
better incentives for middle-level managers provided that there is “less variation”
in interregional performance than in interindustry performance.  But Proposition
2 establishes that it is only at this level that organizational form has any bearing on
incentive issues:  both top- and bottom-level managers’ incentives turn out to be
independent of whether the M-form or the U-form is employed.
Then, in Section 4, we develop the test statistics needed to analyze our
Chinese data set.  Our empirical work is reported in Section 5, where we argue that
there is indeed higher “variation” in performance across industries than across
regions.  We also offer some evidence for the use of yardstick competition in the
Chinese economy.  We make a few concluding remarks in Section 6.
2. THE MODEL
Consider an economy with two regions, A and B; two industries, 1 and 2; and four
plants, one for each region-industry combination:  1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B, where plant
4ir produces industry i output (i=1,2) and is located in region r (r=A,B).  There are
three kinds of shocks s:  shock ? hits all plants in the economy; shock ?i hits just
plants in industry i, i=1,2; shock dr hits region r, r=A,B.2  We assume that the shocks
are jointly normally distributed with zero mean.  Each shock may (but need not) be
assigned to one or more managers.3
A chain of command is a sequence of managers, who directly or indirectly,
oversee a given plant, where each manager “reports” to the next higher manager (if
any), and the highest manager in the sequence reports to no one.  We assume that
each manager can report to at most one other manager in the model.4
A manager who is assigned shock s can exert effort e $ 0 to deal with it.  The
effect of the manager’s presence depends on the magnitude of the shock as
measured by its variance s s2.  The effect takes the form of an increase in the value
of the output of any plant that (i) is hit by the shock that he is assigned and (ii) is
connected to him by a chain of command.  Let e + f(s s2) be that increase in output,5
where f is differentiable and f(0)=0.  Assume that there exists a constant k>0 such
that
(1) df/d(s s2) > k.
Formula (1) says that the bigger the expected magnitude of a shock (as measured
by its variance), the bigger is the expected impact that a manager’s presence has.
We assume that the impact takes the form of a fixed effect f that rises with variance
plus a variable effect that depends on the manager’s effort.
Hence, if there is chain of command for plant ir, consisting of a manager
overseeing shock ?i, who reports to a manager overseeing shock dr, who in turn
reports to a manager overseeing shock ?, then output is:
xir = ei + f(s i2) + er + f(s r2) + e? + f(s ?2) + ?i + dr + ?,
where ei, er and e? are the efforts corresponding to shocks ?i, dr and ? respectively.
The cost of effort e is C(e) where C(0)=0, and
(2) dC/de > 0, and d2C/de2 > 0.
A manager’s utility is given by
U(t) - C(e),
5where t is the manager’s (monetary) payment and U is his von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function. Let U be the manager’s reservation utility, where U>0.
We shall suppose that:
(3) U > maxe (e-C(e)).
That is, unless a shock is of sufficient magnitude, it is not worthwhile hiring a
manager to handle it.
We will suppose that managers’ efforts cannot be directly monitored.  Hence,
a manager’s reward t will depend only on the observable outputs {xir}.  The
organizational problem is to choose a set M of managers, a corresponding set of
chains of command, and a set of reward schemes tj(.) for each manager j so as to
maximize the expected value of net output
3i 3r xir - 3j0M tj(.),
subject to the constraints that each manager get at least his reservation utility and
that he choose an effort level e* that maximizes his own net expected utility:
E[U(t(.)) - C(e)].
It may be useful to give some illustrations of possible organizational forms.
At one extreme is the case in which none of the shocks is handled by a manager,
ie, there is no organization at all.  In this case, each plant operates independently.
Another instance of independent plants is the case in which each plant has a
different manager who oversees and handles the industrial shock hitting it (see
Figure 1).  However, such a configuration involves considerable redundancy, and
since managers are costly, it is dominated by one in which each manager oversees
two plants (see Figure 2).6  In that case, there are, in effect, two organizations.
FIGURE 1
 manager handles ?1       manager handles ?1       manager handles ?2       manager handles ?2
    /      /                                /           /
         plant 1A                        plant 1B     plant 2A       plant 2B
6
7FIGURE 2
         manager handles ?1         manager handles ?2
                ­           ± ­ ±
 plant 1A                  plant 1B         plant 2A           plant 2B
Next let us examine organizations in which both regional and industrial
shocks are handled by managers.  The configurations illustrated by Figures 3 and
4 represent the cases, respectively, of two independent industries and two
independent regions.  Note that both entail some duplication of effort — in Figure
3, there are two managers each handling shocks dr, whereas in Figure 4 there are
two managers each handles shocks ?i.  However, given our assumption that no
manager can report to two bosses, some duplication is unavoidable if all regional
and industrial shocks are to be covered.  One aspect of optimal organizational
design will thus be how to best minimize the cost of such duplication.
FIGURE 3
                 manager handles ?1       manager handles ?2
       ­ ±       ­           ±
manager handles dA  manager handles dB       manager handles dA   manager handles dB
   .       .   .     .
         plant 1A                    plant 1B        plant 2A           plant 2B
FIGURE 4
   manager handles dA       manager handles dB
     ­       ±         ­       ±       
manager handles ?1    manager handles ?2    manager handles ?1    manager handles ?2
.    .         .  .
8    plant 1A          plant 2A    plant 1B       plant 2B
If the shock ? hitting plants is big enough, then a completely integrated
organization may be desirable.  These are the U-form and M-form, illustrated in
Figures 5 and 6, respectively.
FIGURE 5
U-Form
manager handles ?
    ­                   ±
                manager handles ?1   manager handles ?2
                ­          ±             ­        ±
manager handles dA   manager handles dB    manager handles dA  manager handles dB
.              .         .             .
     plant 1A        plant 1B   plant 2A        plant 2B
9FIGURE 6
M-Form
manager handles ?
­ ±
   manager handles dA  manager handles dB
­        ±      ­ ±
manager handles ?1  manager handles ?2     manager handles ?1  manager handles ?2
    . .         .           .
         plant 1A      plant 2A             plant 1B     plant 2B
There are, of course, other possibilities too (see, for example, Figure 7).
FIGURE 7
manager handles ?
­ ± ±
   manager handles ?1  manager handles ?2  manager handles dB 
                        .       .
 manager handles dA manager handles dB   manager handles dA manager handles ?2
      .          .                        .               .
           plant 1A                plant 1B                  plant 2A         plant 2B
Finally, it is possible, of course, that shock ? may be big, but that neither the
regional nor the industrial shocks are significant enough to warrant hiring managers
to handle them.  In that case, we might expect an organizational form as in Figure
8.
FIGURE 8
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manager handles ?
­     ­         ±          ±
    plant 1A   plant 1B    plant 2A   plant 2B
3. THEORETICAL FINDINGS
A. Shocks and Scale Economies
Given that the only role of managers is to handle shocks and that managers are
costly, assumption (3) implies that sufficiently small shocks should not be assigned
to managers.  On the other hand, assumption (1) tells us that big shocks should
have managers.  Our first result establishes that when all shocks are big enough,
either the M-form or the U-form is the optimal organizational form.
Proposition 1:  Under assumptions (1)-(3), there exists v>0 such that, if for all
shocks s, s s2>v, the optimal organization form is either the U-form (see Figure 5)
or the M-form (see Figure 6).
Proof:  From (1), we can choose v such that 
(4) f(v) > U.
Hence, if, for all shocks s, s s2>v, then it is worthwhile assigning every shock to a
manager.  Now conceivably, a manager handling a given shock s could be given
better incentives if there were another manager handling the same shock with
whom his performance could be compared.  But (3) ensures that any such benefit
would be dwarfed by the expense of the additional manager.  Hence it is preferable
for each shock to be handled by as few managers as possible.  One can readily
check that the U-form and M-form are the two structures that minimize that total
number of managers (seven) subject to the constraint that all shocks are handled.
Q.E.D.
Because we are particularly interested in highly integrated organizations, we
shall henceforth assume that all shocks exceed v as given by Proposition 1.
11
B. Information and Incentives
Although Proposition 1 elevates the M-form and U-form above all other
organizational forms, it offers no clue about which will perform better.  We will
argue that there is if there is less “variation” (in the appropriate sense) in shocks
across regions than in shocks across industries, the M-form dominates the U-form
from the standpoint of incentives.
To get a feel for the issues involved, let us consider an even simpler
framework than that of our model.  Suppose that there are two industries, 1 and 2,
and that output in industry i is given by
xi = ei + ei,
where ei is the effort of the manager in charge of shock ei, and (e1, e2) are jointly
normally distributed.  Let us compare this with the case of two regions, A and B,
where output in region r is given by
xr = er + er,
er is the effort of the manager in charge of shock er, and (eA, eB) are jointly normal.
All managers have preferences given by
U(t) - C(e),
where t is a transfer that in the industrial case can depend on (x1, x2), and in the
regional case on (xA, xB).
In which scenario can better incentives be provided?  It turns out that a
comparison of conditional variances is the key.  If
(5) Var(eA # eB) < Var(e1 # e2),
then manager A can be given better incentives than manager 1.  Moreover, if both
(6) min { Var (eA # eB), Var (eB # eA) } < min { Var (e1 # e2), Var (e2 # e1) }
and
(7) max { Var (eA # eB), Var (eB # eA) } < max { Var (e1 # e2), Var (e2 # e1) },
then both managers A and B can be given better incentives than managers 1 and 2.
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The less noisy performance is as a measure of effort, the easier it is to
provide a manager with the incentive to supply effort.  Condition (5) says that the
residual noise that remains in manager A’s performance after it is compared with
that of manager B is smaller than the residual noise that remains in manager 1’s
performance after it is compared with that of manager 2.
To see that if (5) holds, manager A can be predicted with better incentives
than manager 1, fix an effort level e' for manager 2 and assume that managers
choose effort levels noncooperatively.  Suppose that t1(•,•) is an incentive scheme
for manager 1 such that t1(x1, x2) is his transfer conditional on outputs (x1, x2).  We
will show that, if (5) holds, we can find a transfer scheme tA(•,•) as a function of
(xA, xB) such that, if manager B exerts effort e', the scheme tA(•,•) is equivalent to
t1(•,•).  To see this, note that (5) is equivalent to
s A2 - (s AB)2/s B2 # s 12 - (s 12)2/s 22,
where
s r2 = Var(er), r=A,B; s AB = Cov(eA, eB); s i2 = Var(ei), i=1,2; and s 12 = Cov(e1, e2).
Choose scalars
a = s AB/s B2 - s 12/(s 22s B2)½, 
ß = (s 22/s B2)½, and 
? = (1-ß)e'.
Also let z be a normally distributed random variable, independent of xA and xB, with
mean ae' and variance [Var(e1#e2) - Var (eA#eB)].  We claim that if managers 2 and
B choose effort e', then for any choice of effort e by manager 1 and A, the two pairs
of random variable (x1, x2) and (xA - axB + z, ßxB + ?) have the same distributions.
Hence, if we take 
tA(xA, xB) = t1(xA - axB + z, ßxB + ?),
tA(•,•) will be equivalent to t1(•,•).  But because all random variables are normal, it
suffices to show that the two pairs have the same mean and the same covariance
matrix for all e.  In fact:
E(xA - axB + z) = e - ae' + ae' = e = Ex1;
E(ßxB + ?) = ße' + (1-ß)e' = e'= Ex2;
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Var(ßxB + ?) = ß2 Var(xB) = s 22 = Var(x2);
Cov(xA - axB + z, ßxB + ?) = ßs AB2 - aßs B2 = s 122 = Cov(x1, x2);
Var(xA - axB + z) = s A2 - 2as AB + a2s B2 + [Var(e1#e2) - Var (eA#eB)]
= s A2 - s AB2/s B2 + s 122/s 22 + s 12 - s 122/s 22 - (s A2 - s AB2/s B2) = s 12 = Var(x1),
as claimed.
We have been taking e' as fixed for managers 2 and B.  But if (6) and (7)
hold, a similar argument shows that manager B can be induced to choose the same
effort level as manager 2.
So far we have been examining a set-up that is simpler than the model that
we are really interested in.  Let us return, thereafter, to the model of Section 2.
Because the terms f(s s2) do not affect incentives, let us henceforth set them equal
to zero:
(8) f(•) / 0.
As in the stripped-down framework, let us suppose that managers’ efforts cannot
be directly monitored, so that their rewards can be based only on the vector of
outputs
(x1A, x2A, x1B, x2B).
Let us also continue to assume that managers choose their effort levels
noncooperatively.  We first observe that in comparing the M-form and U-form, it
suffices to consider the incentives of only the middle-level managers (regional
managers in the M-form, industrial managers in the U-form); those of top- and
bottom-level managers are the same for either organization.
Proposition 2:  Given any incentive scheme t?(x1A, x2A, x1B, x2B) for the top manager
(the one handling ?) in the M-form, there exists an equivalent scheme t?'(x1A, x2A,
x1B, x2B) for the top manager in the U-form (in the sense that it induces the same
effort level and gives the managers the same expected payoff), and vice versa.
Similarly, given any incentive scheme tir(•) for the industry i manager under the
region r manager in the M-form, there exists an equivalent scheme tri' for the region
r manager under the industry i manager in the U-form, and vice versa.
Proof:  Suppose that the industry 1 manager in region A (manager 1A) in the M-
form faces incentive scheme t1A(x1A, x2A, x1B, x2B).  Moreover, suppose that, given
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their incentive schemes, the other bottom-level managers are induced to choose
levels e2A*, e1B*, e2B* (where eir* is the effort level of manager ir), the middle-level
managers are induced to choose levels eA* and eB*, and the top manager level e?*.
Now consider the U-form and suppose that the bottom-level managers other
than A1 (the region A manager in industry 1) have incentive schemes that induce
them to choose levels eA2**, eB1**, eB2**, the middle-level managers e1** and e2**,
and the top-level manager e?**.  Endow manager A1 with transfer function
  tA1'(x1A, x2A, x1B, x2B) = t1A(x1A+eA*+e?*-e1**-e?**, x2A+eA*+e?*-e2**-e?**+e2A*-eA2**, 
                                           x1B+eB*+e?*-e1**-e?**+e1B*-eB1**, x2B+eB*+e?*-e2**-e?**+e2B*-eB2**).
It is then straightforward to verify that, for any effort choice e by managers A1 or
1A, the random variables tA1'(•,•,•,•) and t1A(•,•,•,•) are the same.  The argument for
top managers is similar.  Q.E.D.
The proof of Proposition 2 relies on a simple idea:  the information available
on which to base incentives is the same across organizational forms for both top-
and bottom-level managers.  However, as our stripped-down model above suggests,
the same is not true of middle-level managers.  Indeed, a major theme of this paper
is that an important respect in which organizational forms differ is precisely in the
information that they give rise to.
In both the M-form and U-form, incentive schemes can depend on (x1A, x2A,
x1B, x2B).  However, the way this set is partitioned into spheres of influence of the
two middle-level managers differs.  In the M-form, the region A and B managers
affect (x1A, x2A) and  (x1B, x2B) respectively, whereas in the U-form, the industry 1
and 2 managers affect (x1A, x1B) and  (x2A, x2B) respectively.  In our stripped-down
model, the M-form dominated the U-form from the standpoint of incentives if the
M-form’s associated conditional variances were smaller than those of the U-form.
Now, in the full-blown model, we must compare pairs of random variables, which
may seem more complicated than the stripped-down analysis. But it turns out that
the comparisons can be reduced to one dimension.  Specifically, let ?A solve
(9) min ? Var (?e1A + (1-?)e2A # e1B, e2B),
and let ?1 solve
(10) min ? Var (?e1A + (1-?)e1B # e2A, e2B).
Define ?B and ?2 analogously.  We will show that the M-form generates better
incentives than the U-form provided that 
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min { Var (eA # eB), Var (eB # eA) } < min { Var (e1 # e2), Var (e2 # e1) )
and
max { Var (eA # eB), Var (eB # eA) } < max { Var (e1 # e2), Var (e2 # e1) ),
where, for r = A, B,
er = ?re1r + (1-?r)e2r
and, for i = 1, 2,
ei = ?ieiA + (1-?i)eiB.
(The “max” and “min” operators reflect the fact that the labels “1”, “2”, “A”, and
“B” are arbitrary.)
To establish this result, we first establish that appropriately aggregated
information is equivalent to disaggregated information for incentive purposes.
Because the shock ? plays no role in the subsequent analysis, we henceforth ignore
it.
We take
? = (?1, ?2, dA, dB)', S = var(?),
eu = (e1A, e1B, e2A, e2B)', Su = var(eu),
em = (e1A, e2A, e1B, e2B)', Sm = var(em),
where 
(e1A, e1B, e2A, e2B)' = Au?,  Su = AuSAu',
(e1A, e2A, e1B, e2B)' = Am?,  Sm = AmSAm'
16
Au '
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
, Am '
1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1
.
A '
1 0
1 0
0 1
0 1
Qu '
1 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 1
1 0 1
Qm '
1 0 1
0 1 1
1 0 0
0 1 0
,
and
Note that both Au and Am are singular, and so are Su and Sm.  However, one
can verify that Rank(Au)=Rank(Am)=3, and Au'R=0 and Am'R=0 for R=(1,-1,-1,1)'.
Lemma 1:   If  (x1A, x1B, x2A, x2B)   and   (x1A*, x2A*, x1B*, x2B*)  are the outputs  in
the U-form and M-form respectively, we can express
(x1A, x1B, x2A, x2B) = (x1, x1, x2, x2) + (u1, u2, u3, u4)
and (x1A*, x2A*, x1B*, x2B*) = (xA*, xA*, xB*, xB*) + (v1, v2, v3, v4),
where  (x1, x1, x2, x2)  and  (u1, u2, u3, u4) are uncorrelated, (xA*, xA*, xB*, xB*) and
(v1, v2, v3, v4) are uncorrelated, and
(x1, x2)' = (Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu)-1 Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Qu'(x1A, x1B, x2A, x2B)'
(xA*, xB*)' = (Cm'(Cm1SCm1')-1 Cm)-1 Cm'(Cm1SCm1')-1 Qm'(x1A*, x2A*, x1B*, x2B*)'
Cu = Qu'A, Cu1 = Qu'Au, Cm = Qm'A, Cm1 = Qm'Am,
and (Cu1SCu1') and (Cm1SCm1') are non-singular 3x3 matrices.
Proof:  We prove Lemma 1 for the U-form (the M-form argument is similar).  Let
x = (x1A, x1B, x2A, x2B)' and ß=(e1,e2)'.  Then under the U-form:
x = Aß + Au?.
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Let x = A(x1, x2)' = (x1, x1, x2, x2)' and u = (u1, u2, u3, u4) = x-x.  Because Eu=Ex-
Ex=Aß-Aß=0, to show x and u are uncorrelated, we need only show that Exu'=0.
In fact,
Exu'
= Ex(x-x)'
= E {A(Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu)-1 Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Qu'(Aß+Au?)}
{(I-A(Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu)-1 Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Qu')(Aß+Au?)}'
= E {A(Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu)-1 Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Qu'(Aß+Au?)}
      (Au?)'{I-A(Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu)-1 Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Qu'}'
= E {Aß + A(Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu)-1 Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu1 ?}
      ?'Au'{I-Qu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu (Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu)-1 A'}
= A(Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu)-1 Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu1 E(??') Au'
  - A(Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu)-1 Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu1 E(??')Cu1'(Cu1SCu1')-1
    Cu (Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu)-1 A'
= A(Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu)-1 Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu1 S Au' - A(Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu)-1 A'
We multiply Exu' from the right a non-singular matrix [Qu, R], we have,
[A(Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu)-1 Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu1 S Au' - A(Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu)-1 A']Qu
= A(Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu)-1 Cu' - A(Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu)-1 Cu'
= 0.
We also have
[A(Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu)-1 Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu1 S Au' - A(Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu)-1 A']R = 0
because Au'R=0 and A'R = 0.
Therefore, Exu' = 0, that is, x and u are uncorrelated and x = x + u.  Q.E.D.
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Remark:  One can show x1 and xA as defined in Lemma 1 are just ?1x1A +(1-?1)x1B
and ?Ax1A* +(1-?A)x2A*, where ?1 and  ?A are given by (9) and (10), respectively.
Similarly for x2 and xB. 
Lemma 2:  Let t1(x1A, x1B, x2A, x2B) be any transfer scheme for manager 1 in the U-
form.  Fix the effort levels at e' for all managers but manager A in the M-form and
manager 1 in the U-form.  There exists an equivalent transfer scheme for manager
A in the M-form, ie, a scheme tA(x1A*, x2A*, x1B*, x2B*) such that for all transfer values
t  and all effort levels e by manager A or manager 1,
Prob ( tA(x1A*, x2A*, x1B*, x2B*) = t  # e) = Prob ( t1(x1A, x1B, x2A, x2B) = t  # e),
if and only if
Var (eA#eB) # Var(e1#e2),
where
(e1, e2)' = (Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu)-1 Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu1 ?, and
(eA, eB)' = (Cm'(Cm1SCm1')-1 Cm)-1 Cm'(Cm1SCm1')-1 Cm1 ?.
Proof: From our analysis of the stripped-down model, Var (eA#eB) #
Var(e1#e2) implies that there exist constant a, ß, ? and random noise z uncorrelated
with (xA, xB) such that for all e1=eA,
(x1, x1, x2, x2) = (xA* - axB*, xA* - axB*, ßxB*, ßxB*) + (z, z, ?, ?)  in distribution.
By Lemma 1, we can choose a random vector (w1, w2, w3, w4) such that
(i) Var(w1, w2, w3, w4) = Var(u1, u2, u3, u4) = Var(x1A, x1B, x2A, x2B) - Var(x1, x1, x2, x2); 
and
(ii) (w1, w2, w3, w4) is independent of (x1, x2), (xA*, xB*), and z.  
Then we obtain,
Var(x1A, x1B, x2A, x2B) 
= Var(x1, x1, x2, x2) + [Var(x1A, x1B, x2A, x2B) - Var(x1, x1, x2, x2)]
= Var(xA* - axB*, xA* - axB*, ßxB*, ßxB*) + Var(z, z, ?, ?) + Var(w1, w2, w3, w4)
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= Var(xA* - axB* + z + w1, xA* - axB* + z + w2, ßxB* + ? + w3, ßxB* + ? + w4).
Furthermore,
E (x1A, x1B, x2A, x2B) 
= E (x1, x1, x2, x2)
= E (xA* - axB* + z + w1, xA* - axB* + z + w2, ßxB* + ? + w3, ßxB* + ? + w4).
Therefore we obtain
(x1A, x1B, x2A, x2B) = (xA*-axB*+z+w1, xA*-axB*+z+w2, ßxB*+?+w3, ßxB*+?+w4)
in distribution.
Finally, we define
tA(x1A*, x2A*, x1B*, x2B*)
= t1(xA*-axB*+z+w1, xA*-axB*+z+w2, ßxB*+?+w3, ßxB*+?+w4),
which in distribution is the same as t1(x1A, x1B, x2A, x2B).  Q.E.D.
Applying Lemma 2, we can compare the M-form and U-form
straightforwardly as follows:
Proposition 3:  Incentives under the M-form are at least as good as those under the
U-form (in the sense that any U-form incentive scheme can be replicated by an M-
form incentive scheme) provided that
max { Var (eA # eB), Var (eB # eA) } 
# max { Var (e1 # e2), Var (e2 # e1) },
and
min { Var (eA # eB), Var (eB # eA) } 
# min { Var (e1 # e2), Var (e2 # e1) },
where eB, eA, e1, and e2 are given by Lemma 2.
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When there is symmetry across regions and across industries and no
correlation between industrial and regional shocks, the formulas of Proposition 3
simplify into the following condition:
Corollary:    Assume  Var(dA)  =  Var(dB)  =  VR2,   Var(?1)   =  Var(?2)  =  VI2,
Cov(?i, dr)   =   0   for   i=1,2   and    r=A,B.     Let   V12   =   Cov   (?1, ?2)    and
VAB = Cov (dA, dB).  Then, incentives under the M-form are at least as good as those
under the U-form if and only if VR2 - VAB # VI2 - V12.
4. TEST STATISTICS
We wish to test the inequalities in Proposition 3 using Chinese data.  To do so, we
need to derive the test statistics for the conditional variances under the M-form and
U-form organizations.
Suppose we have sample industry-specific and region-specific shocks
?t' = (?1t, ?2t, dAt, dBt)
t=1,...,T, which is drawn from a population N(0,S), where
S '
s 11, s 12, s 1A, s 1B
s 21, s 22, s 2A, s 2B
s A1, s A2, s AA, s AB
s B1, s B2, s BA, s BB
Let sample mean and sample covariance be, respectively,
?T = (1/T) St=1T ?t,   and
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Sˆ ' (1/T) St'1
T (?t&?T)(?t&?T)' '
sˆ 11, sˆ 12, sˆ 1A, sˆ 1B
sˆ 21, sˆ 22, sˆ 2A, sˆ 2B
sˆ A1, sˆ A2, sˆ AA, sˆ AB
sˆ B1, sˆ B2, sˆ BA, sˆ BB
F (S) '
F u(S)
F m(S)
'
Cu'(CulSCul')
&1Cu)
&1Cu'(CulSCul')
&1Cul
Cm'(CmlSCml')
&1Cm)
&1Cm'(CmlSCml')
&1Cml
.
Vectorizing   S   and we haveSˆ ,
T 1/2 (vec(Sˆ)&vec(S)) v N(0, B(S)), as T v 4
where B(S) is a 16x16 matrix with elements bij,kl = s iks jl + s ils jk, i,j,k,l = 1,2,A,B
(Theorem 3.4.4 from Anderson, 1984).
We want to test
Var (eA#eB) # Var(e1#e2) and Var (eB#eA) # Var(e2#e1),
where
(e1, e2)' = (Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu)-1 Cu'(Cu1SCu1')-1 Cu1 ?'
(eA, eB)' = (Cm'(Cm1SCm1')-1 Cm)-1 Cm'(Cm1SCm1')-1 Cm1 ?'
Write e = (e1, e2, eA, eB)', and
Then
e = F (S) ? ~ N(0, O),
where
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O ' F (S) SF (S)' '
? 11, ? 12, ? 1A, ? 1B
? 21, ? 22, ? 2A, ? 2B
? A1, ? A2, ? AA, ? AB
? B1, ? B2, ? BA, ? BB
T 1/2 (h(O(Sˆ)) & h(O(S))) ÷ N(0, D(S)),
Define
h1(O) = V(eA#eB) - V(e1#e2) = [? AA - ? AB? BB-1? BA] - [? 11 - ? 12? 22-1? 21],
h2(O) = V(eB#eA) - V(e2#e1) = [? BB - ? BA? AA-1? AB] - [? 22 - ? 21? 11-1? 12], and
h(O)' = (h1(O), h2(O)).
We want to test:
H0: h(O) # 0 vs. H1: h(O) e R2
Using matrix differential calculus (Magnus and Neudecker, 1988,  pp.27-31,
46-48, 94-97, 147-149, and 173-184), we derive the following
Lemma 3: We have
with
D(S) = (dh(O)/d(vec(O))') (dvec(O)/d(vec(S))') B(S) (dvec(O)/d(vec(S))')' (dh(S)/d(vec(S))')',
dh(O)/d(vec(O))'    =  
dh1(O)/d(vec(O))'
dh2(O)/d(vec(O))'
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'
&1, ? 22
&1? 21, 0, 0, ? 12? 22
&1, &? 12? 22
&2? 21, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, &? BB
&1? BA, 0, 0,&? AB? BB
&1, ? AB? BB
&2? BA
&? 21? 11
&2? 12, ? 21?
&1
11, 0, 0, ? 11
&1? 12, &1, 0, 0, 0, 0, ? BA? AA
&2? AB,&? BA? AA
&1, 0, 0,&? AA
&1? AB, 1
,
'
&F u(S)qCul'(CulSCul')
&1Cul % F u(S)qCul'(CulSCul')
&1CuF u(S)
&F m(S)qCml'(CmlSCml')
&1Cml % F m(S)qCml'(CmlSCml')
&1CmF m(S)
d(vec(S)) .
V(S) '
&F u(S)qCul'(CulSCul')
&1Cul % F u(S)qCul'(CulSCul')
&1CuF u(S)
&F m(S)qCml'(CmlSCml')
&1Cml % F m(S)qCml'(CmlSCml')
&1CmF m(S)
.
dvec(O)/d(vec(S))' = F (S)qF (S) + (K+I)(IqF (S)S)V(S),
where q is the Kronecker product, K is the commutation matrix, I is the identity
matrix, and V(S) is defined below.7
Proof:  Using matrix differential calculus we obtain
dO = d(F (S)SF (S)') = dF (S) SF (S)' + F (S) dS F (S)' + F (S)S dF (S)'. (3)
Using matrix differential calculus again, for i = u,m, we obtain:
dF i(S)' = d{Ci1'(Ci1SCi1)-1Ci(Ci'(Ci1SCi1)-1Ci)-1}
   = -Ci1'(Ci1SCi1')-1Ci1(dS)F i(S)'+ Ci1'(Ci1SCi1')-1CiF i(S)(dS)F i(S)'.
Thus,
dF (S)' = [-Cu1'(Cu1SCu1')-1Cu1(dS)F u(S)'+ Cu1'(Cu1SCu1')-1CuF u(S)(dS)F u(S)',
           -Cm1'(Cm1SCm1')-1Cm1(dS)F m(S)'+Cm1'(Cm1SCm1')-1CmF m(S)(dS)F m(S)']
and
vec(dF (S)') = vec {[-(F u(S)qCu1'(Cu1SCu1')-1Cu1)+(F u(S)qCu1'(Cu1SCu1')-1CuF u(S)]d(vec(S)),
  [-(F m(S)qCm1'(Cm1SCm1')-1Cm1)+(F m(S)qCm1'(Cm1SCm1')-1CmF m(S)]d(vec(S))}
Write
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h(O(Sˆ)) ' h(O(S)) % T &1/2 v ,
TSh ' min { T (h(O(Sˆ)) & x)' D(Sˆ)
&1 (h(O(Sˆ)) & x) , s.t.x # 0} ,(11)
Then
vec(dF (S)') = V(S) d(vec(S)), and
vec(dF (S)) = vec(dF (S)')' = K vec(dF (S)')
=   K V(S) d(vec(S)).
Therefore, using (3), we get
dvec(O) = vec(dO)
= (F (S)SqI)vec(dF (S)) + (F (S)qF (S))vec(dS) + (IqF (S)S)vec(dF (S)')
= (F (S)SqI)KV(S)d(vec(S)) + (F (S)qF (S))vec(dS) + (IqF (S)S)V(S)d(vec(S))
= [F (S)qF (S) + (K+I)(IqF (S)S)V(S)]d(vec(S)).
Hence,
dvec(O)/d(vec(S))' = F (S)qF (S) + (K+I)(IqF (S)S)V(S).  Q.E.D.
We now consider the problem
where v ~ N(0, D(S)).  We test h(O(S)) # 0 vs. h(O(S)) e R2 with the test statistic
which has the asymptotic distribution of a weighted sum of ?12 and ?22 distributions
and the weights are (½) and w respectively, where 0 # w = (½)p-1 arccos(?12) # ½
(?12 is the correlation coefficient associated with D) (Wolak, 1987).
Define c such that 
(12) (½) prob (?12 $ c) + (w) prob (?22 $ c) = 0.01a.
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Then if TSh # c, H0 is accepted; and if TSh > c, H0 is rejected (at a% significance
level).
An easier method without using the weight w is to find lower bound cR and
upper bound cu which are solutions to:
(1/2) prob (?12 $ cR) = 0.01a
(13) (1/2) prob (?12 $ cu) + (1/2) prob (?22 $ cu) = 0.01a.
Obviously, cR < c < cu.  We calculate from the ?2 distribution table that cR = 2.7 and
cu = 5.2 at 5% significance level. If TSh # cR, H0 is accepted; if TSh $ cu, H0 is
rejected; and if cR < TSh < cu, it is inconclusive (at a% significance level).  However,
when it is inconclusive, an exact test (with the above c) has to be done and
therefore (13) has to be solved.
5. AN APPLICATION TO CHINA
A. The M-Form Economy of China
Chandler (1966) and Williamson (1975) characterized the two predominant
organizational forms of business corporations:  the U-form and the M-form.  The
U-form corporation has a unitary structure and is organized along functional lines.
It was popular in the late 1800s and early 1900s.  The M-form corporation, by
contrast, consists of reasonably self-contained divisions and emerged in the 1920s.
Recently, Qian and Xu (1993) proposed comparing the transition paths of
economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EEFSU) with that of
China from the standpoint of organizational structures.  They observed that the
economies of EEFSU resembled U-forms (also known as “branch organizations”),
whereas the Chinese hierarchy has taken an M-form structure, in which divisions
correspond to regions.8
It is well documented that enterprises in EEFSU were grouped by industry,
each of which was supervised by a ministry (Gregory and Stuart 1989).9  In order
to fully exploit scale economies and avoid conflicting operations, there was little
overlap of functions across ministries.  Enterprises were highly specialized.
Because of the strong interdependence between enterprises in different regions,
comprehensive planning and administrative coordination between ministries at the
top level of government were crucial for the normal operation of the economy.
China’s planning system began by imitating the U-form Soviet model in its
first five-year plan (1953-57), which was formulated with the help of the Soviets.
As serious economic problems emerged, however, China started to deviate from the
Soviet scheme and moved toward an M-form economy in the late 1950s.  In the
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process, “blocks” (kuaikuai), ie, regions, replaced “branches” (tiaotiao), ie,
specialized ministries, as the foundation of the planning system.  In fact, there are
now six regional levels for adminstration:  central, provincial, prefecture, county,
township and village (a municipality can have the rank of province, prefecture or
county).  Regions at the county level and above are relatively self-contained;
indeed, they are nearly self-sufficient in function.  Hence, the Chinese M-form is
“deep” and differs from the U-form of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in a
thorough-going way.
B.  Evidence on Conditional Variances of Industrial and Regional Shocks
We now investigate whether the conditional variance condition of Proposition 3
holds empirically.  Implicitly, we are comparing the Chinese organizational form
(M-form) with a hypothetical U-form.  In this U-form, all firms would be organized
into hypothetical industrial ministries (although some industrial ministries actually
exist in China, most state firms are under the control of regional governments).  We
will compare conditional variances of regional and industrial shocks under M-form
and U-form arrangements.
Our data set consists of 520 Chinese state-owned enterprise from 1986 to
1991.10  The enterprises sampled are drawn from more than 30 manufacturing
industries, located in major cities in 20 different provinces.  The data set contains
industry classification codes and location codes for each firm.
In our regressions, we group the data by region and by industry so that a
proper sample size is maintained.  Moreover, as much as possible, we try to reflect
actual organization.  For industries, we group the data into units similar to Eastern
European-style ministries, with headings such as “machinery,” “chemicals,” and
“textiles”.  Indeed, because of data limitations, we concentrate on these three
industries in particular, since they have the largest sample sizes.  Because sample
sizes in individual cities are too small, our regional exercises are carried out in two
ways.  In the first scheme (Table 1), the cities are grouped into provinces.  We
select the five provinces with the largest sample sizes.  These are Liaoning, Hubei,
Hunan, Jiangsu (which includes Shanghai), and Hebei (which includes Beijing and
Tianjin).  In the second scheme (Table 2), we organize cities into “large regions,”
where each region contains three to six neighboring provinces.  We choose the four
regions with the largest sample sizes.  These are “East” (Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang,
and Shanghai), “North” (Hebei, Henan, Shandong, Shanxi, Beijing, Tianjin),
“Northeast” (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning), and “Central South” (Hubei, Hunan,
Guangdong, Guangxi, and Fujian), which comprise a total of 18 provinces.
We use the log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function as our regression
model to estimate industry-specific shocks (?) and region-specific shocks (d).  For
every industry i, region r, and period t, we include dummy variables DitI and DrtR.
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The coefficients of these dummies serve as proxies for the industry-specific and
region-specific shocks in the given period.  Formally, we have
    E(y#L, k)
= (ß+Si=1IßiDiI)L + (?+Si=1I?iDiI)K + St=1T Dt ? t + St=1T Sr=1R DrtR drt + St=1T Si=1I DitI ?it
= (ß+Si=1IßiDiI)L + (?+Si=1I?iDiI)K + St=1T Dt ? t
    + St=1T [DRtR dRt + Sr=1R-1 DrtR drt] + St=1T [DItI?It + Si=1I-1 DitI ?it]
= (ß+Si=1IßiDiI)L + (?+Si=1I?iDiI)K + St=1T Dt ? t
    + St=1T {(DtT - Sr=1R-1 DrtR)dRt + Sr=1R-1 DrtR drt} + St=1T {(DtT - Si=1I-1 DitI)?It + Si=1I-1 DitI ?it}
= (ß+Si=1IßiDiI)L + (?+Si=1I?iDiI)K + St=1T DtT ?t + St=1T Sr=1R-1 DrtR drt' + St=1T Si=1I-1 DitI ?it'
where
?t = ? t + dRt + ?It,
drt' = drt - dRt, and
?it' = ?it - ?It,
for t = 1, ..., T; r = 1,2, ..., R-1; and i = 1,2, ..., I-1.
Because of an identification problem,11 we cannot estimate (?it, drt) directly.
Instead, we drop the dummy variables of one region and one industry, and estimate
the coefficients of the dummy variables for the remaining regions and industries.
This can be interpreted as using the shocks in one region and one industry as a
benchmark to estimate relative industry-specific and relative region-specific shocks
(?it', drt').
For any three regions and three industries, R = I = 3, and T = 6, we take
region 3 (or region C) and industry 3 as benchmarks.  From the regressions we
obtain a time series (?1t', ?2t', dAt', dBt'), which, for notational simplicity, we denote
by ?t = (?1t, ?2t, dAt, dBt).  In the test, we treat these estimated shocks as if they were
real shocks that are uncorrelated over time.
We test the hypothesis that the conditional variances under the M-form are
no greater than those under the U-form.  The results are reported in columns (4)-(8)
of Tables 1 and 2.  Columns (4)-(7) report estimated conditional variances of
regional shocks and industrial shocks, and column (8) reports the estimated test
statistic TSh.
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Of the 63 results in Table 1, there are 44 cases in which TSh = 0, that is, the
estimated means of both conditional variances under the M-form are smaller than
their counterparts under the U-form.  In these cases, our hypothesis cannot be
rejected at any significance level.  In the remaining 29 cases where TSh > 0, no
value of TSh is larger than 1.64 which is the lower bound at the 1% significance
level.  Thus, the hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 1% level.  The results in Table
2 show that out of 36 possible pairs of comparisons, TSh = 0 in 25 pairs.  In the
remaining 11 pairs our test statistic TSh is positive, that is, at least one estimated
mean conditional variance under the M-form is greater than its counterpart under
the U-form.  At the 5% significance level, we have the lower bound cR = 2.7 and the
upper bound cu = 5.2.  In 10 out of the 11 pairs TSh < 2.7, and only one pair (TSh
= 3.16) falls into the inconclusive interval (2.7, 5.2).  Therefore, except for one case
out of 36, our hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level.  In view
of Proposition 3, this test result suggests that, for the case of Chinese enterprises,
the M-form provides better information than the U-form on relative performance.
C. Evidence on Regional Yardstick Competition
The findings of Section 5B suggest that the M-form facilitates yardstick
competition, but one may ask whether such relative performance evaluations are
actually used in China.  We now provide some evidence that they are.
Anecdotes
The Chinese central government has pursued an explicit policy during reform to
encourage regions to “get rich first”.  Indeed, relative performance criteria are
sometimes formally incorporated in the procedures for determining government
officials’ promotions and bonuses.  For example, from her (1995) field work,
Whiting reports that county governments use the annual ranking of townships (by
profit rate on total capital) as a primary criterion to evaluate township government
officials.  As she notes, “Such a system also allowed county officials to compare the
performance of township leaders across locales and helped identify the most
competent cadres for promotion” (Chapter 2 in Whiting, 1995).
All regional governments lay great stress on relative performance in their
public actions and pronouncements.12  Government statistical reports and the mass
media regularly publish rankings of regions in terms of their performances in
growth, profit, foreign investment, etc.  Most authoritative national statistical books,
such as the Almanac of China’s Economy, the Finance Year Book of China, the
Market Statistical Yearbook of China, the China Means of Production Market
Statistical Yearbook, and the China Statistical Yearbook, publish national rankings
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of provinces.  Almost all of the 30 provincial statistical yearbooks report rankings
of cities and/or counties within the provinces every year.
Systematic Evidence
We next provide some evidence on promotions of regional government officials
based on relative performance evaluation.  The Chinese political system is still
under one-party rule, and so the representation of a region in the Party Central
Committee indicates the status and power of the regional government officials.
Reflecting the increased importance of regions in government, regional
representation in the Party’s Congress and Central Committee as a whole has
increased significantly over the reform period.  For example, in the 14th Party
Congress, more than 70% of delegates were from provinces, whereas only about
16% were from the central government and central Party organs (Saich, 1992).
We use a province’s representation in the Party’s Central Committee as a
proxy for the promotion chances of officials in that province.  We normalize the
representation by the province’s population so as to use the “per capita number of
Central Committee members” as an index.  This is the ratio between the number of
Central Committee members from that region and the region’s population.  We
measure economic performance of a province by its growth rate in “national
income” (the rough equivalent of GDP).
Table 3 lists the ranking of provincial per capita number of Central
Committee members in the 11th Party Congress in 1977 (prank77r) and in the 13th
Party Congress in 1987 (prank87r), and the ranking of provincial economic
performance in growth rate one year before the Party Congress, that is, in 1976
(erank76r) and in 1986 (erank86r) respectively (data for Ningxia and Tibet are not
available).  The 11th Central Committee was formed before reform started, and at
that time promotion criteria were mostly political.  It could, therefore, be viewed as
a benchmark.  The 13th Central Committee was formed in 1987 when reform had
been ongoing for almost a decade, and improving economic performance was
officially stated as the central task of the Party.  Table 3 shows that some provinces
(eg Fujian, Jiangsu, Xinjiang, Zhejiang) improved their relative growth rankings,
and their relative rankings of representation in the Central Committee also increased
significantly.  In contrast, the relative growth rankings of some provinces (eg
Anhui, Guangxi, and Qinghai) deteriorated, and so did their rankings in
representation in the Central Committee.13
To investigate the use of relative performance incentives, we focus on how
the change of relative ranking in economic performance is related to the change of
relative ranking in per capita number of Central Committee members.  A simple
regression model using the data in Table 3 shows the following result (standard
error of the estimated coefficient is in parentheses):
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PINDEXr = - 0.453 + 1.76 EINDEXr,  R2 = 0.671.
  (0.246)
where
EINDEXr = 10*{(1/erank86r) - (1/erank76r) + (1/erank86r)2},
and
PINDEXr = 10*{(1/prank87r) - (1/prank77r) + (1/prank87r)2}.
For province r, EINDEXr is the index that measures the change in rank in economic
performance between 1976 and 1986, while PINDEXr is the index that measures the
change in rank in political position between 1977 and 1987.  Note that we work
with inverses.  The third terms in EINDEX and PINDEX, (1/erank86r)2} and
(1/prank87r)2} respectively, are incorporated into the indices of change in order to
capture the feature that staying at the top requires more effort — and thus requires
greater reward — than staying at the bottom.14
The significant positive correlation between the change of relative economic
performance and the change of relative political position of a region suggests the
use of regional yardstick competition.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our work is complementary to some other comparative studies of organizations.
Arrow (1974) argues, as we do, that the information structures to which
organizations give rise constitute an important characteristic by which they should
be compared. Williamson (1975) suggests that in a U-form organization, the CEO
may be overloaded with daily operational decisions, and therefore cannot
concentrate on strategic decisions.  An M-form organization helps to mitigate the
overload by decentralizing decision-making.  Milgrom and Roberts (1992)
emphasize the advantage of the M-form corporation in coordinating finance and
investment decisions.  Aghion and Tirole (1995) compare the M-form and U-form
from the standpoint of encouraging managerial initiative.  Qian, Roland and Xu
(1997) focus on organizational coordination issues, which they model as the
problem of getting attributes suitably matched.  They compare the M-form and U-
form’s efficacy in coordinating changes such as reform and innovation.  Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1991; 1994) study how tasks should be allocated to firms and
managers when managers may perform more than one task.  Aoki (1986)
investigates how Japanese firms are organized differently from those in the US and
what implications these differences have for comparative performance.
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Our approach is potentially applicable to a range of economic and political
issues beyond those treated in this paper.  For example, it may form the basis of a
theory of how nations respond to major emergencies, such as wars or natural
disasters.  If one thinks of such an emergency as a shock that is common to most
aspects of a nation’s operations, then our framework explains why a frequent
reaction is to centralize authority (see also Bolton and Farrell, 1990 and Weitzman,
1974).
The framework may also be able to shed light on corporate mergers and
spin-offs.  Our theory has the testable implication that there should be more
mergers in industries where there are strong common shocks.  Moreover, it implies
that one should normally see a greater correlation between the performances of two
divisions within the same organization, say Cadillac and Oldsmobile within General
Motors, than between those of divisions in separate corporations, say Cadillac in
General Motors and Lincoln in Ford.
In closing, let us note that one hotly debated issue of current interest is how
the European Union — in particular, the EU central bank — should be organized.
One point of view favors organization according to specialization, another
according to region.  Our theory offers clear-cut advice:  regional organization is
preferable if and only if the conditional variances associated with regions are
smaller than those associated with the bank’s special tasks.
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1. Radner (1993) also emphasizes economies of scale, but in his case they are
computational.  Other recent explanations for integration include Grossman and
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), who examine how different ownership
patterns affect the incentives to invest.  Our approach is silent on the issue of who
owns the various plants.  Bolton and Farrell (1990), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994),
and Qian, Roland, and Xu (1997) concentrate on the coordination advantages of
integration.
2. There is another — and perhaps more “standard” — interpretation of our
model.  Instead of an entire economy, think of a corporation, say, an automobile
manufacturer.  The “regions” would then correspond to two different car models,
whereas the two “industries” would become two different specialized departments,
eg production and purchasing.  Shocks to “regions” (models) could then be
interpreted as shifts in demand for these models, whereas shocks to “industries”
(departments) might reflect changes in the cost of labor or parts.
3. We assume that a single manager cannot efficiently handle more than one
shock.  Implicit here is the idea that to deal with a shock properly a manager must
take a significant fixed investment of time and knowledge (indeed, we can interpret
U as that investment).
4. The justification for the restriction that a manager reports to only one direct
superior (ie, each manager has only one “boss”) is that bosses give orders and that,
with multiple bosses, one boss’s orders might fail to be informed by another boss’s
information.  To give a stylized example, suppose that industry 1 is “agriculture”
and that region A is “Hunan Province.”  Assume that the provincial minister
(governor) oversees the agricultural minister in Hunan.  Imagine that the governor
detects a demographic trend that, as applied to agriculture, calls for growing more
soy beans.  He therefore issues a directive to that effect to the agriculture minister.
Given this directive, the agriculture minister then investigates how shocks may have
affected supplies of the principal input into soy production — say, a certain kind
of fertilizer.  Accordingly, he gives orders to ensure that soy bean growers get
sufficient quantities of this fertilizer.  Notice that if he had not received the
governor's directive, he would not have known to concentrate particularly on soy
beans in his evaluation of agricultural shocks.  Therefore, an arrangement in which
the agriculture minister is independent of the governor either would not work at all
or else would require that the agricultural minister issue complicated contingent
orders.
ENDNOTES
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5. We are normalizing output so that zero corresponds to expected output in the
absence of a manager (since means are unimportant in our analysis, we can
normalize them any way we wish).
6. As we will see in the proof of Proposition 1, this conclusion relies on our
assumption (3).
7. Let U be an m×n matrix and W be an p×q matrix.  The Kronecker product
of U and W (UqW) is defined by the following mp × nq matrix
u11W ... u1nW
umlW ... umnW
(Magnus and Neudecker, 1988, p.27).
Let A be an m×n matrix.  The commutation matrix K is such that
K vec A = vec A'
(Magnus and  Neudecker, 1988, pp.46-48).
8. Qian and Xu (1993) discussed the overall costs and benefits of U-forms and
M-forms in terms of scale economies, incentives, and coordination, and also the
implications of these costs and benefits for alternative approaches to reform.
9. Khrushchev tried to change the Soviet economy from a U-form to an M-form
by abolishing the ministries all together and introduced 105 Regional Economic
Councils (Sovnarkhozy) in 1957.  But his endeavor soon failed (Gregory and Stuart,
1989).
10. The data were collected by the China System Reform Research Institute,
Beijing, China.
11. Dummy variables here have the following property:
DtT = Sr=1R DrtR = Si=1I DitI = 1 in period t
= 0, otherwise,
that is, the sum of the regional dummies is the same as that of the industrial
dummies creating a collinearity problem.
34
12. For instance, when Ningguo county of Anhui province was ranked in the top
one hundred counties in China, the governor of the province made some highly
publicized inspection visits to the county (Statistic Yearbook of Anhui, 1995).
13. There are of course important political factors that also had influence on the
selection of the Central Committee members.  Before reform, provinces such as
Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi provinces were over-represented in the Central
Committee because these were the home provinces of many revolutionary leaders
(eg Mao Zedong was from Hunan) and other provinces such as Beijing were under-
represented because of the purge in the Cultural Revolution, which ended just
before the 11th Party Congress.  Furthermore, some provinces such as Xinjiang
have always been over-represented because of their political significance.
14. We have run many more regressions with alternative data sets and have
obtained qualitatively similar results.  Those results are available upon request.
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TABLE 1
Testing Industrial and Regional Variance and Conditional Variance (by Province)
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5
V(eA#eB) V(eB#eA) V(e1#e2) V(e2#e1) Th
PR11 0.0008187 0.0007571 0.0030142 0.0024633 0
PR12 0.0009656 0.0013551 0.0028583 0.0100515 0
PR13 0.0009623 0.0021445 0.0040004 0.0016873 0.1606919
PR14 0.0003254 0.0009305 0.0038165 0.0011762 0
PR15 0.0007978 0.0003191 0.0045005 0.0016317 0
PR16 0.0015251 0.0019038 0.0028962 0.0022384 0
PR17 0.0019566 0.0010847 0.0024202 0.0015482 0
PR18 0.0006965 0.0005134 0.0019411 0.0011535 0
PR19 0.0036261 0.0010941 0.0027306 0.0027949 0.1239956
PR21 0.0035188 0.0075737 0.004532 0.0014271 1.2422196
PR22 0.0125974 0.0033652 0.0064482 0.0027321 1.1546736
PR23 0.0007243 0.0005763 0.0032571 0.0019396 0
PR24 0.0035512 0.0017348 0.0083718 0.0076624 0
PR25 0.0008053 0.0056084 0.0031696 0.0041095 0.1412761
PR26 0.0011198 0.0012982 0.0280702 0.0043337 0
PR27 0.0035219 0.0014758 0.0014134 0.0045301 1.4297282
PR28 0.0032017 0.0036066 0.0022232 0.0039406 0.4174463
PR29 0.0009339 0.0006265 0.0059682  0.0121066 0
PR31 0.0041727 0.0043189 0.0086372 0.0023456 0.5450603
PR32 0.0116553 0.00325 0.0114781 0.0047748 0
PR33 0.0003516 0.0002477 0.0032018 0.0012271 0
PR34 0.0022851 0.0012984 0.0096523 0.0044628 0
PR35 0.0014829 0.0069914 0.0063509 0.0042792 0.2695177
PR36 0.001434 0.0013309 0.0381816 0.0041133 0
PR37 0.0017801 0.0006927 0.0026892 0.0043122 0
PR38 0.0039548 0.0055769 0.0033635 0.0040625 0.1768892
PR39 0.0002523 0.000138 0.0012346 0.0083788 0
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Each line of the Tables 1 and 2 corresponding to one set of results corresponding
to a specific three regions and three industries with one of the them taken as a
benchmark.  All the 63 lines in Table 1 are divided into seven groups.  The seven groups
are the following:  group 1:  Jiangsu, Hebei, Liaoning; group 2:  Jiangsu, Liaoning, Hubei;
group 3:  Jiangsu, Liaoning, Hunan; group 4:  Hubei,  Liaoning, Hunan; group 5:  Hebei,
Liaoning, Hubei; group 6:   Hebei, Liaoning, Hunan; and group 7:  Hubei, Jiangsu, Hunan.
In Table 2, the 36 lines are divided into four groups:  group 1:  East, North, Northeast;
group 2:  East, North, Central South; group 3:  Northeast, North, Central South; group 4:
Northeast, East, Central South.  Within each group, we have nine comparison results by
rotating the benchmark region and the benchmark industry among the three regions and
three industries within the group. 
TABLE 1 (continued)
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5
V(eA#eB) V(eB#eA) V(e1#e2) V(e2#e1) Th
PR41 0.0022107 0.0042633 0.0063843 0.0044466 0
PR42 0.0045825 0.0036649 0.009163 0.0031834 0.03309
PR43 0.0042087 0.0078392 0.0067047 0.0037866 1.283058
PR44 0.0026567 0.0021724 0.0101624 0.0078117 0
PR45 0.0048027 0.0033586 0.0066146 0.0599119 0
PR46 0.0052495 0.0025457 0.0174984 0.0066967 0
PR47 0.0028687 0.002188 0.0051838 0.0071966 0
PR48 0.0044801 0.0044515 0.0031598 0.0106808 0.272044
PR49 0.0047402 0.0031740 0.0051034 0.0113329 0
PR51 0.0019198 0.00453 0.0024876 0.0018453 0.899438
PR52 0.002041 0.0014745 0.00241 0.0018914 0
PR53 0.0005682 0.0008727 0.0025407 0.0024924 0
PR54 0.0040096 0.001339 0.003392 0.0067175 0.0484
PR55 0.0006512 0.0012565 0.0028805 0.0143283 0
PR56 0.0008774 0.001117 0.0029163 0.0067734 0
PR57 0.0019528 0.0024209 0.0020744 0.0072606 0
PR58 0.0011385 0.0013931 0.0018707 0.0102239 0
PR59 0.0006934 0.0008906 0.0039924 0.0069858 0
PR61 0.0021139 0.0058389 0.0051549 0.0041415 0.296586
PR62 0.0038292 0.0020893 0.0047473 0.0045516 0
PR63 0.0011121 0.0016206 0.0049029 0.0046627 0
PR64 0.0021749 0.0014442 0.0044179 0.0027746 0
PR65 0.0018646 0.0028379 0.0040928 0.012857 0
PR66 0.001113 0.0010564 0.0062856 0.0031007 0
PR67 0.0030414 0.0009696 0.0041567 0.0027338 0
PR68 0.0022042 0.0028437 0.0041358 0.0069915 0
PR69 0.001927 0.0008932 0.0063637 0.002802 0
PR71 0.0024754 0.0050791 0.0102891 0.0083058 0
PR72 0.0033104 0.002966 0.0083431 0.0060816 0
PR73 0.0033779 0.0083795 0.0154754 0.0061027 0.256782
PR74 0.002703 0.001844 0.0066952 0.0023344 0
PR75 0.0047986 0.003487 0.0113504 0.0428088 0
PR76 0.0041169 0.0020171 0.0082085 0.0022948 0
PR77 0.0055198 0.0018183 0.0048365 0.0022892 0.05085
PR78 0.0043981 0.0047133 0.0047888 0.0067743 0
PR79 0.0058755 0.0018537 0.0043716 0.0023171 0.232477
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TABLE 2
Testing Industrial and Regional Variance and Conditional Variance
 (by Large Region)
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5
V(eA#eB) V(eB#eA) V(e1#e2) V(e2#e1) Th
LR11 0.0009876 0.000717 0.0025903 0.0014356 0
LR12 0.0008853 0.0005627 0.0061475 0.0015846 0
LR13 0.0020441 0.0007281 0.0026581 0.0040902 0
LR14 0.0008268 0.0007193 0.0024435 0.0027816 0
LR15 0.0006873 0.0011279 0.0092834 0.0012659 0
LR 16 0.0007685 0.0011829 0.0033395 0.0015871 0
LR17 0.0005151 0.0011678 0.0016032 0.0024889 0
LR18 0.0007956 0.000601 0.0014715 0.0018291 0
LR19 0.0008224 0.0015445 0.0018787 0.0012828 0.0485825
LR21 0.0005335 0.001472 0.000835 0.0095962 0
LR22 0.0016437 0.0005659 0.0014412 0.0060323 0.0622105
LR23 0.0012722 0.0007375 0.007627 0.0068863 0
LR24 0.0009478 0.0012606 0.003262 0.0062783 0
LR25 0.0004361 0.0003698 0.0005611 0.0006254 0
LR26 0.000618 0.0006669 0.0020611 0.0013201 0
LR27 0.0015519 0.0010175 0.0072856 0.0062593 0
LR28 0.0002648 0.0016529 0.0072931 0.000737 0.1577814
LR29 0.0002031 0.0021522 0.0058771 0.000439 0.0807599
LR31 0.0005775 0.0012875 0.001453 0.0040046 0
LR32 0.0017089 0.0005776 0.0013437 0.0021527 0.5853984
LR33 0.0011759 0.0008448 0.0035925 0.0021431 0
LR34 0.0007168 0.0007843 0.0016867 0.0047914 0
LR35 0.000916 0.0006686 0.0011856 0.0015126 0
LR36 0.0010723 0.0008347 0.0053094 0.0019045 0
LR37 0.0011079 0.000722 0.0025876 0.0029192 0
LR38 0.0007325 0.0034549 0.0022474 0.002 0.3518275
LR39 0.0007093 0.0028758 0.0023074 0.0017212 0.0907792
LR41 0.0010433 0.0040568 0.0016852 0.0015885 0.9165561
LR42 0.0050836 0.0011803 0.0015829 0.0036032 3.1585944
LR43 0.0008049 0.0006459 0.0027002 0.0015179 0
LR44 0.0012797 0.0016134 0.0015776 0.0027378 0
LR45 0.0005507 0.0011771 0.0016617 0.0014342 0
LR46 0.0004704 0.0009846 0.0167323 0.001396 0
LR47 0.0031506 0.0007645 0.0014811 0.0039824 0.6695789
LR48 0.0006126 0.001314 0.0022435 0.0013026 0.0003513
LR49 0.0010576 0.0007848 0.0040202 0.0029437 0
TABLE 3
Provincial Ranking in Economic Performance and Political Position
1976 1977 1986 1987
Province Rank in
Economic
Growtha
(erank76)
Rank in Party
Central Committee
Membershipb
(prank77)
Rank in
Economic
Growtha
(erank86)
Rank in Party
Central
Committee
Membershipb
(prank87)
Anhui 24 15 27 21
Beijing 1 27 1 1
Fujian 21 6 10 5
Gansu 8 23 20 15
Guangdong 12 21 12 9
Guangxi 11 16 25 26
Guizhou 27 24 24 22
Hebei 18 10 21 11
Heilongjiang 7 26 16 23
Henan 20 20 17 25
Hubei 22 5 14 17
Hunan 19 2 23 19
Jiangsu 16 12 7 4
Jiangxi 25 1 26 24
Jilin 14 22 18 10
Liaoning 4 17 6 7
NeiMongolia 9 14 15 14
Qinghai 3 9 5 27
Shaanxi 6 7 8 20
Shandong 10 13 11 6
Shanghai 2 4 2 2
Shanxi 23 3 19 13
Sichuan 26 18 22 18
Tianjin 5 11 4 12
Xinjiang 13 8 9 3
Yunnan 15 25 13 16
Zhejiang 17 19 3 8
Sources:  (a) State Statistic Bureau, 1990; and (b) Bartke, 1990, p.374.
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